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Decentralized Q-Learning
for Stochastic Teams and Games
Gu¨rdal Arslan and Serdar Yu¨ksel, Member, IEEE
Abstract—There are only a few learning algorithms applicable
to stochastic dynamic teams and games which generalize Markov
decision processes to decentralized stochastic control problems
involving possibly self-interested decision makers. Learning in
games is generally difficult because of the non-stationary envi-
ronment in which each decision maker aims to learn its optimal
decisions with minimal information in the presence of the other
decision makers who are also learning. In stochastic dynamic
games, learning is more challenging because, while learning, the
decision makers alter the state of the system and hence the
future cost. In this paper, we present decentralized Q-learning
algorithms for stochastic games, and study their convergence for
the weakly acyclic case which includes team problems as an
important special case. The algorithm is decentralized in that
each decision maker has access to only its local information, the
state information, and the local cost realizations; furthermore, it
is completely oblivious to the presence of other decision makers.
We show that these algorithms converge to equilibrium policies
almost surely in large classes of stochastic games.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper aims at developing new learning algorithms
with desirable convergence properties for certain classes of
stochastic games, which are discrete-time dynamic games in
which the history can be summarized by a “state” [1]. More
specifically, we focus on weakly acyclic stochastic games that
can be used to model cooperative systems. The chief merit of
the paper lies in the fact that learning takes place in stochastic
games, which are truly dynamic games, as opposed to learning
in repeated games in which the same single-stage game is
played in every stage. In stochastic games, the policies selected
by the decision makers not only impact their immediate cost
but also alter the stage-games to be played in the future
through the state dynamics. Hence, our results are applicable
to a significantly broader set of applications.
The existing literature on learning in stochastic games is
very small in comparison with the literature on learning in
repeated games. As the method of reinforcement learning
gained popularity in the context of Markov decision problems,
a surge of interest in generalizing the method of reinforcement
learning, in particular Q-learning algorithm [2], to stochastic
games has led to a set of publications primarily in the computer
science literature; see [3] and the references therein. In many
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of these publications, the authors tend to assume that the real
objective of the agents 1 is for some reason to find and play an
equilibrium strategy (and sometimes this even requires agents
to somehow agree on a particular equilibrium strategy), and
not necessarily to pursue their own objectives. Another serious
issue is that the multi-agent algorithms introduced in many of
these recent papers are not scalable since each agent needs to
maintain estimates of its Q-factors for each state/joint action
pair and compute an equilibrium at each step of the algorithm
using the updated estimates, assuming that the actions and
objectives are exchanged between all agents.
Standard Q-learning, which enables an agent to learn how
to play optimally in a single-agent environment, has also been
applied to very specific multi agent applications [4], [5]. Here,
each agent runs a standard Q-learning algorithm by ignoring
the other agents, and hence information exchange between
agents and computational burden on each agent are substan-
tially lower than aforementioned multi-agent extensions of Q-
learning algorithm. Also, standard Q-learning in a multi-agent
environment makes sense from individual bounded rationality
point of view. However, no analytical results exist regarding
the properties of standard Q-learning in a stochastic game
setting.
We should also mention several attempts to extend a well-
known learning algorithm called Fictitious Play (FP) [6], [7]
to stochastic games [8], [9], [10]. The joint action learning
algorithm presented in [8] would be computationally pro-
hibitive quickly as the number of agents/states/actions grow.
The algorithms presented in [8] are claimed to be convergent
to an equilibrium in single-state single-stage common interest
games but without a proof. The extension of FP considered in
[9] requires each agent to calculate a stationary policy at each
step in response to the empirical frequencies of the stationary
policies calculated and announced by other agents in the past.
The main contribution of [9] is to show that such FP algorithm
is not convergent even in the simplest 2x2x2 stochastic game
where there are two states and two agents with two moves for
each agent. The version of FP used in [10] is applicable only
to zero-sum games (strictly adversarial games).
Other related work includes [11], [12], [13]. In [11], a multi-
agent version of an actor-critic algorithm [14] is shown to
be convergent to generalized equilibria in a weak sense of
convergence, whereas in [12] a policy iteration algorithm is
presented without rigorous results for stochastic games. The
algorithms given in [11], [12] are rational from individual
agent perspective, however they require higher level of data
storing and processing than standard Q-learning. The paper
1The terms “agent” and “decision maker” are used interchangeably.
2[13] uses the policy iteration algorithm given in [12] in
conjunction with certain approximation methods to deal with
a large state-space in a specific card-game without rigorous
results.
We should emphasize that our viewpoint is individual
bounded rationality and strategic decision making, that is,
agents should act to pursue their own objectives even in
the short term using localized information and reasonable
algorithms. It is also desired that agent strategies converge
to an agreeable solution in cooperative situations where agent
objectives are aligned with system designer’s objective even
though agents do not necessarily strive for converging to a
particular strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §II, the
model is introduced. In § III, the specifics of the learning
paradigm and the standard Q-learning algorithm is discussed,
followed by the presentation of our first Q-learning algorithm
for stochastic games and its convergence properties. General-
izations of our main results in § III are presented in §IV. This is
followed by a simulation study in §V. The paper is concluded
with some final remarks in §VI. Appendices contain the proofs
of the technical results in the paper.
II. STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES
Consider the (discrete-time) networked control system illus-
trated in Figure 1 where xt is the state of the system at time
t, uit is the input generated by controller i at time t, and wt
is the random disturbance input at time t. Suppose that each
Fig. 1. A networked control system.
controller i is an autonomous decision maker (DM) interested
in minimizing its own long-term cost
E

∑
t≥0
ci(xt, u
1
t , . . . , u
N
t )


where ci(xt, u1t , . . . , uNt ) is the cost incurred by controller i at
time t, and E[·] denotes the expectation given a collection of
control policies (which will be specified later in the paper) on
a probability space (Ω,F , P ). Although controller i can only
choose its own decisions ui0, ui1, . . . , its cost generally depends
on the decisions of all controllers through its single-stage cost
as well as the state dynamics. This dynamic coupling between
self-interested DMs with long-term objectives naturally lead
to the framework of stochastic games [1] which generalize
Markov decision problems.
Over the past half-century, there have been many appli-
cations of stochastic games on control problems; see Chap-
ter XIV in [15] as an early reference. At the present time,
the control theory literature includes a large number of pa-
pers employing the theory of stochastic games and their
continuous-time counterparts called “differential games” [16].
Many papers in this body of work study a zero-sum game
between a controller which aims to optimize the system
performance and an adversary which controls certain system
parameters and inputs to make the system performance as poor
as possible. We selectively cite [17] for robust control and
minimax estimation problems, [18] for flow control in queue-
ing networks, [19] for control of hybrid systems, and [20] for
robustness, security, and resilience of cyber-physical control
systems. The case of nonzero-sum games in which the decision
makers do not always have diametrically opposed objectives
has also received significant attention; see for example [21] on
admission, service, and routing control in queueing systems,
[22] on transmission control in cognitive radio systems, [23]
on network security, and [24] on formation control.
We should also mention the work on team decision problems
where all DMs share a common long-term objective albeit with
access to different information variables; see e.g., [25], [26]. In
this paper, differently from the usual team decision problems
in the literature, even though each DM has access to the state
information, it does not have access to global information
on the other DMs, and even their presence. We also note
that the emergence of distributed control systems requires
the formulation of “team problems” within a game-theoretic
framework where local controllers are tasked to achieve one
system level objective without centralized coordination; see for
example [27] on distributed model predictive control. This type
of team problems and its generalizations where the objectives
of DMs are aligned in some sense with a team objective are
the primary focus of our work though the class of games
considered in this paper is more general and it even includes
some zero-sum stochastic games.
A. Discounted Stochastic Dynamic Games
A (finite) discounted stochastic game has the following
ingredients; see [1].
• A finite set of DMs with the i−th DM referred to as DMi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
• a finite set X of states
• a finite set Ui of control decisions for each DMi
• a cost function ci for each DMi determining DMi’s cost
ci(x, u1, . . . , uN ) at each state x ∈ X and for each joint
decision (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ U1 × · · ·UN
• a discount factor βi ∈ (0, 1) for each DMi
• a random initial state x0 ∈ X
• a transition kernel for the probability P [x′|x, u1, . . . , uN ]
of each state transition from x ∈ X to x′ ∈ X for each
joint decision (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ U1 × · · ·UN .
Such a stochastic game induces a discrete-time controlled
Markov process where the state at time t is denoted by xt ∈ X
starting with the initial state x0. At any time t ≥ 0, each
DMi makes a control decision uit ∈ Ui (possibly randomly)
3based on the available information. The state xt and the
joint decisions (u1t , ..., uNt ) together determine each DMi’s
cost ci(xt, u1t , ..., u
N
t ) at time t as well as the probability
distribution P [ · | xt, u1t , ..., uNt ] with which the next state
xt+1 is selected.
A policy for a DM is a rule of choosing an appropriate
control decision at any time based on the DM’s history of
observations. We will focus on stationary policies of the form
where a DM’s decision at time t is determined solely based
on the state xt. Such policies for each DMi are identified
by mappings from the state space X to the set P(Ui) of
probability distributions on Ui. The interpretation is that a
DMi using such a policy πi : X 7→ P(Ui) makes its decision
uit at any time t by choosing randomly from Ui according
to πi(xt). We will denote the set of such policies by ∆i for
each DMi. We will primarily be interested in deterministic
(stationary) policies2 denoted by Πi for each DMi, where each
policy πi ∈ Πi is identified by a mapping from X to Ui.
The objective of each DMi is to find a policy πi ∈ ∆i that
minimizes its expected discounted cost
J ix(π
1, . . . πN ) = Ex

∑
t≥0
(βi)tci
(
xt, u
1
t , . . . , u
N
t
) (1)
for all x ∈ X, where Ex denotes the conditional expectation
given x0 = x. Since DMs have possibly different cost
functions and each DM’s cost may depend on the control
decisions of the other DMs, we adopt the notion of equilibrium
to represent those policies that are person-by-person optimal.
For ease of notation, we denote the policies of all DMs
other than DMi by π−i. For future reference, we also define
Π−i := ×j 6=iΠ
j and ∆−i := ×j 6=i∆j as well as Π := ×jΠj
and ∆ := ×j∆j . Using this notation, we write a joint policy
(π1, . . . πN ) as (πi, π−i) and J ix(π1, . . . πN ) as J ix(πi, π−i).
Definition 1: A joint policy (π∗1, . . . , π∗N ) ∈ ∆ constitutes
an (Markov perfect) equilibrium if, for all i, x,
J ix(π
∗i, π∗−i) = min
πi∈∆i
J ix(π
i, π∗−i).
It is known that any finite discounted stochastic game pos-
sesses an equilibrium policy as defined above [28].
Although the minimum above can always be achieved by
a deterministic policy in Πi (since each DMi’s problem is
a stationary Markov decision problem when the policies of
the other DMs are fixed at π∗−i), a deterministic equilibrium
policy may not exist in general. However, many interesting
classes of games do possess equilibrium in deterministic
policies. In particular, large classes of games arising from
applications where all DMs benefit from cooperation possess
equilibrium in deterministic policies. The primary examples
of such games of cooperation are team problems where all
DMs have the same cost function. In team problems, the
deterministic policies minimizing the common cost function
are clearly equilibrium policies although non-optimal deter-
ministic equilibrium policies may also exist. A more general
set of games of cooperation are those in which some function,
2When it is not clear from the context, a “policy” will mean a deterministic
policy.
called the potential function, decreases whenever a single DM
decreases its own cost by unilaterally switching from one
deterministic policy to another one. In this class of games,
the deterministic policies minimizing the potential function are
equilibrium policies. As such, we are primarily interested in
the set of deterministic equilibrium policies denoted by Πeq,
where Πeq ⊂ Π.
We next formally introduce the set of games considered in
this paper.
B. Weakly Acyclic Games
Let Πiπ−i denote DM
i
’s set of (deterministic) best replies
to any π−i ∈ ∆−i, i.e.,
Πiπ−i :=
{
πˆi ∈ Πi : Jx(πˆ
i, π−i) = min
πi∈∆i
Jx(π
i, π−i),
for all x
}
.
DMi’s best replies to any π−i ∈ ∆−i can be characterized by
its optimal Q-factors Qiπ−i satisfying the fixed point equation
Qiπ−i(x, u
i) =Eπ−i(x)
[
ci(x, ui, u−i)
+ βi
∑
x′∈X
P [x′|x, ui, u−i] min
vi∈Ui
Qiπ−i(x
′, vi)
]
(2)
for all x, ui, where Eπ−i(x) denotes the expectation with
respect to the joint distribution of u−i given by π−i(x) =
π1(x)× · · · × πi−1(x)× πi+1(x)× · · · × πN (x). The optimal
Q-factor Qiπ−i(x, ui) represents DMi’s expected discounted
cost to go from the initial state x assuming that DMi initially
chooses ui and uses an optimal policy thereafter while the
other DMs use π−i. One can then write Πiπ−i as
Πiπ−i =
{
πˆi ∈ Πi : Qiπ−i(x, πˆ
i(x)) = min
vi∈Ui
Qiπ−i(x, v
i),
for all x
}
.
The set of (deterministic) joint best replies is denoted by
Ππ := Π
1
π−1 × · · · × Π
N
π−N . Any best reply πˆ
i ∈ Πiπ−i of
DMi is called a strict best reply with respect to (πi, π−i) if
J ix(πˆ
i, π−i) < J ix(π
i, π−i), for some x.
Such a strict best reply πˆi achieves DMi’s minimum cost given
π−i for all initial states and results in a strict improvement over
πi for at least one initial state.
Definition 2: We call a (possibly finite) sequence of deter-
ministic joint policies π0, π1, . . . a strict best reply path if, for
each k, πk and πk+1 differ in exactly one DM position, say
DMi, and πik+1 is a strict best reply with respect to πk.
Definition 3: A discounted stochastic game is called weakly
acyclic under strict best replies if there is a strict best reply
path starting from each deterministic joint policy and ending
at a deterministic equilibrium policy.
Figure 2 shows the strict best reply graph of a game where
the nodes represent the deterministic joint policies and the
directed edges represent the single-DM strict best replies. Each
deterministic equilibrium policy is represented by a sink, i.e.,
a node with no outgoing edges, in such a graph. Note that the
game illustrated in Figure 2 is weakly acyclic under strict best
4Fig. 2. The strict best reply graph of a stochastic game.
replies since there is a path from every node to a sink (π7 or
π10). Note also that a weakly acyclic game may have cycles in
its strict best reply graph, for example, π1 → π4 → π12 → π9
in Figure 2.
Weakly acyclic games constitute a fairly large class of
games. In the case of single-stage games, all potential games
as well as dominance solvable games are examples of weakly
acyclic games; see [29]. We note that the concept of weak
acyclicity introduced in this paper is with respect to the
stationary Markov policies for stochastic games, and consti-
tutes a generalization of weak acyclicity introduced in [30]
for single-stage games. The primary examples of weakly
acyclic games in the case of stochastic games are the team
problems with finite state and control sets where DMs have
identical cost functions and discount factors. Clearly, many
other classes of stochastic games are weakly acyclic, e.g.,
appropriate multi-stage generalizations of potential games and
dominance solvable games restricted to the stationary Markov
policies are weakly acyclic for the same reason that the single-
stage versions of these games are weakly acyclic [29].
C. A Best Reply Process for Weakly Acyclic Games
Consider a policy adjustment process in which only one DM
updates its policy at each step by switching to one of its strict
best replies. Such a process would terminate at an equilibrium
policy if the game has no cycles in its strict best reply graph
and the process continues until no DM has strict best replies.
A weakly acyclic game may contain cycles in its strict best
reply graph but there must be some edges leaving each cycle
because otherwise there would not be a path from each node
to a sink. Therefore, as long as each updating DM considers
each of its strict best replies with positive probability, the
adjustment process would terminate at an equilibrium policy
in a weakly acyclic game with probability (w.p.) one. This
adjustment process would require a criterion to determine the
updating DM at each step and the DMs would have to a
priori agree to this criterion. An equilibrium policy can be
reached through a similar adjustment process without a pre-
game agreement on the selection of the updating DM, if all
DMs update their policies at each step but with some inertia.
Consider now the following policy adjustment process, which
is the best reply process with memory length of one and inertia
introduced in Sections 6.4-6.5 of [30].
Best Reply Process with Inertia (for DMi):
Set parameters
λi ∈ (0, 1): inertia
Initialize πi0 ∈ Πi (arbitrary)
Iterate k ≥ 0
If πik ∈ Πiπ−i
k
πik+1 = π
i
k
Else
πik+1 =
{
πik w.p. λi
any πi ∈ Πi
π−i
k
w.p. (1− λi)/
∣∣∣Πi
π−i
k
∣∣∣
End
On the one hand, if the joint policy πk := (π1k, . . . , πNk ) is
an equilibrium policy at any step k, then the policies will never
change in the subsequent steps. On the other hand, regardless
of what the joint policy πk := (π1k, . . . , πNk ) is at any step k,
the joint policy πk+L in L steps later will be an equilibrium
policy with positive probability pmin > 0 where L is the
maximum length of the shortest strict best reply path from
any policy to an equilibrium policy and pmin depends only
on the inertias λ1, . . . , λN , and L. This readily implies that
the best reply process with inertia will reach an equilibrium
policy in finite number of steps w.p. 1 [30], i.e.,
P [πk = π
∗, for some π∗ ∈ Πeq and all large k <∞] = 1.
We now note that each updating DMi at step k needs to
compute its best replies Πi
π−i
k
, which can be done by first
solving the fixed point equation (2) for π−i = π−ik . DMi
can solve (2), for example through value iterations, provided
that DMi knows the state transition probabilities P and the
policies π−ik of the other DMs to evaluate the expectations in
(2). In most realistic situations, DMs would not have access to
such information and therefore would not be able to compute
their best replies directly. In the next section, we introduce our
learning paradigm in which DMs would be able to learn their
near best replies with minimal information and adjust their
policies (approximately) along the strict best reply paths as in
the best reply process with inertia.
III. Q-LEARNING IN STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES
A. Learning Paradigm for Stochastic Dynamic Games
The learning setup involves specifying the information that
DMs have access to. We assume that each DMi knows its own
set Ui of decisions and its own discount factor βi. In addition,
before choosing its decision uit at any time t, each DMi has
the knowledge of
• its own past decisions ui0, . . . , uit−1, and
• past and current state realizations x0, . . . , xt, and
• its own past cost realizations
ci(x0, u
i
0, u
−i
0 ), . . . , c
i(xt−1, u
i
t−1, u
−i
t−1).
Each DMi has access to no other information such as the state
transition probabilities or any information regarding the other
DMs (not even the existence of the other DMs). In effect,
the problem of decision making from the perspective of each
DMi appears to be a stationary Markov decision problem. It
is reasonable that each DMi with this view of its environment
would use the standard Q-learning algorithm [2] to learn its
5optimal Q-factors and its optimal decisions. This would lead
to the following Q-learning dynamics for each DMi:
Qit+1(x, u
i) =Qit(x, u
i), for all (x, ui) 6= (xt, uit)
Qit+1(xt, u
i
t) =Q
i
t(xt, u
i
t) + α
i
t
[
ci(xt, u
i
t, u
−i
t )
+ βi min
vi∈Ui
Qit(xt+1, v
i)−Qit(xt, u
i
t)
]
where αit ∈ [0, 1] denotes DMi’s step size at time t.
If only one DM, say DMi, were to use Q-learning and
the other DMs used constant policies π−i, then DMi would
asymptotically learn its corresponding optimal Q-factors, i.e.,
P [Qit → Q
i
π−i ] = 1
provided that all state-control pairs x, ui are visited infinitely
often and the step sizes are reduced at a proper rate. This
follows from the well-known convergence of Q-learning in
a stationary environment; see [31]. To exploit the learnt Q-
factors while maintaining exploration, the actual decisions are
often selected with very high probability as
uit ∈ argminvi∈UiQit(xt, vi)
and with some small probability any decision in Ui is exper-
imented. One common way of achieving this for DMi is to
select any decision ui ∈ Ui randomly according to (Boltzman
action selection)
P [uit = u
i|Ft] =
e−Q
i
t(xt,u
i)/τ∑
vi∈Ui e
−Qit(xt,v
i)/τ
where τ > 0 is a small constant called the temperature
parameter, and Ft is the history of the random events realized
up to the point just before the selection of (u1t , . . . , uNt ).
However, when all DMs use Q-learning and select their de-
cisions as described above, the environment is non-stationary
for all DMs, and there is no reason to expect convergence
in that case. In fact, one can construct examples where DMs
using Q-learning are caught up in persistent oscillations; see
Section 4 in [32] for the non-convergence of Q-learning in
Shapley’s game. However, the convergence of Q-learning may
still be possible in team problems, coordination-type games,
or more generally in weakly-acyclic games. It is instructive to
first consider the repeated games.
Here, there is no state dynamics (the set X of states is a
singleton) and the DMs have no look-ahead (β1 = · · ·βN =
0). The only dynamics in this case is due to Q-learning which
reduces to the averaging dynamics
Qit+1(u
i) = Qit(u
i), for all ui 6= uit (3)
Qit+1(u
i
t) = Q
i
t(u
i
t) + α
i
t
[
ci(uit, u
−i
t )−Q
i
t(u
i
t)
] (4)
where
P [uit = u
i|Ft] =
e−Q
i
t(u
i)/τ∑
vi∈Ui e
−Qit(v
i)/τ
. (5)
The long-term behavior of these averaging dynamics is ana-
lyzed in [32] and strongly connected to the long-term behavior
of the well-known Stochastic Fictitious Play (SFP) dynamics
[33] in the case of two DMs; see Lemma 4.1 in [32]. In two-
DM SFP, each DMi tracks the empirical frequencies of the past
decisions of its opponent DM−i and chooses a nearly optimal
response (with some experimentation) based on the incorrect
assumption that DM−i will choose its decisions according to
the empirical frequencies of its past decisions
q−it (u
−i) =
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
I{u−it =u−i}
, for all u−i
where I{·} is the indicator function and
P [uit = u
i|Ft] =
e−M
i
t (u
i)/τ∑
vi∈Ui e
−Mit (v
i)/τ
M it (u
i) :=
∑
u−i
q−it (u
−i)ci(ui, u−i).
Using the connection between Q-learning dynamics (4)-
(5) and SFP dynamics, the convergence of Q-learning (4)-(5)
is established in zero-sum games as well as in partnership
games with two DMs; see Proposition 4.2 in [32]. It may
be possible to extend this convergence result to multi-DM
potential games [34], [35], but this is currently unresolved.
However, given the nonconvergence of FP (where DMs choose
exact optimal responses with no experimentation, i.e., τ ↓ 0)
in some coordination games [36], the prospect of establishing
the convergence of Q-learning even in all two-DM weakly
acyclic games does not seem promising.
It is possible to employ additional features such as the trun-
cation of the observation history or multi-time-scale learning
to obtain learning dynamics that are convergent in all repeated
weakly acyclic games; see our own previous work [37] and the
others [38], [30], [39], [40]. However, the question of learning
an equilibrium policy in stochastic games is an open question.
The only relevant reference considering the stochastic games is
[11] where each DM uses value learning coupled with policy
search at a slower time-scale. The results in [11] apply to
all stochastic games and therefore they are necessarily quite
weak. Loosely speaking, the main result in [11] shows that
the limit points of certain empirical measures (weighted with
the step sizes) in the policy space constitute “generalized Nash
equilibria”, which in particular does not imply convergence of
learning to an equilibrium policy. In the next subsection, we
propose a simple variation of Q-learning which converges to
an equilibrium policy in all weakly acyclic stochastic games.
B. Q-Learning in Stochastic Dynamic Games
The discussion in the previous subsection reveals that the
standard Q-learning (4)-(5) can lead to robust oscillations even
in repeated coordination games. The main obstacle to conver-
gence of Q-learning in games is due to the presence of multiple
active learners leading to a non-stationary environment for all
learners. To overcome this obstacle, we use some inspiration
from our previous work [37] on repeated games and modify
the Q-learning for stochastic games as follows. In our variation
of Q-learning, we allow DMs to use constant policies for
extended periods of time called exploration phases.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the k−th exploration phase runs
through times t = tk, . . . , tk+1 − 1, where
tk+1 = tk + Tk (with tk = 0)
6Fig. 3. An illustration of the k−th exploration phase.
for some integer Tk ∈ [1,∞) denoting the length of the
k−th exploration phase. During the k−th exploration phase,
DMs use some constant policies π1k, . . . , πNk as their baseline
policies with occasional experimentation. The essence of the
main idea is to create a stationary environment over each
exploration phase so that DMs can accurately learn their
optimal Q-factors corresponding to the constant policies used
during each exploration phase. Before arguing why this would
lead to an equilibrium policy in all weakly acyclic stochastic
games, let us introduce our variation of Q-learning more
precisely.
Algorithm 1 (for DMi):
Set parameters
Qi: some compact subset of the Euclidian space R|X×Ui|
where |X× Ui| is the number of pairs (x, ui)
{Tk}k≥0: sequence of integers in [1,∞)
ρi ∈ (0, 1): experimentation probability
λi ∈ (0, 1): inertia
δi ∈ (0,∞): tolerance level for sub-optimality
{αin}n≥0: sequence of step sizes where
αin ∈ [0, 1],
∑
n α
i
n =∞,
∑
n
(
αin
)2
<∞
(e.g., αin = 1/nr where r ∈ (1/2, 1])
Initialize πi0 ∈ Πi (arbitrary), Qi0 ∈ Qi (arbitrary)
Receive x0
Iterate k ≥ 0
(k−th exploration phase)
Iterate t = tk, . . . , tk+1 − 1
uit =
{
πik(xt), w.p. 1− ρi
any ui ∈ Ui, w.p. ρi/|Ui|
Receive ci(xt, uit, u−it )
Receive xt+1 (selected according to P [ · | xt, uit, u−it ])
nit = the number of visits to (xt, uit) in the k−th
exploration phase up to t
Qit+1(xt, u
i
t) = (1− α
i
nit
)Qit(xt, u
i
t)
+αi
nit
[
ci(xt, u
i
t, u
−i
t )+ β
iminvi Q
i
t(xt+1, v
i)
]
Qit+1(x, u
i) = Qit(x, u
i), for all (x, ui) 6= (xt, uit)
End
Πik+1 =
{
πˆi ∈ Πi : Qitk+1(x, πˆ
i(x))
≤ minvi Q
i
tk+1
(x, vi)+δi, for all x
}
If πik ∈ Πik+1
πik+1 = π
i
k
Else
πik+1 =
{
πik, w.p. λi
any πi ∈ Πik+1, w.p. (1− λi)/|Πik+1|
End
Reset Qitk+1 to any Q
i ∈ Qi (e.g., project Qitk+1 onto Qi)
End
Algorithm 1 mimics the best reply process with inertia in
§II-C arbitrarily closely with arbitrarily high probability under
certain conditions. The key difference here is that each DM
using Algorithm 1 approximately learns its optimal Q-factors
during each exploration phase with limited observations. Ac-
cordingly, each DM updates its (baseline) policy to one of
its near best replies with inertia based on its learnt Q-factors.
Hence, Algorithm 1 can be regarded as an approximation to
the best reply process with inertia in §II-C; see [41] where best
replies are obtained based on rewards that must be estimated
using noisy observations.
Assumption 1: For all (x′, x), there exists a finite integer
H ≥ 0 and joint decisions u˜0, . . . , u˜H such that
P [xH+1 = x
′ | (x0, u0, . . . , uH) = (x, u˜0, . . . , u˜H)] > 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that the step sizes satisfy the well-
known conditions of the stochastic approximation theory [31]
during each exploration phase.
Assumption 2: For all i, 0 < δi < δ¯ and 0 < ρi < ρ¯, where
δ¯ and ρ¯ (which depend only on the parameters of the game at
hand) are defined in Appendix B.
Assumption 2 requires that the tolerance levels for sub-
optimality used in the computation of near best replies as well
as the experimentation probabilities be nonzero but sufficiently
small.
Theorem 1: Consider a discounted stochastic game that
is weakly acyclic under strict best replies. Suppose that
each DMi updates its policies by Algorithm 1. Let Assump-
tion 1 and 2 hold.
(i) For any ǫ > 0, there exist T˜ < ∞, k˜ < ∞ such that if
minℓ Tℓ ≥ T˜ , then
P [πk ∈ Πeq] ≥ 1− ǫ, for all k ≥ k˜.
(ii) If Tk →∞, then
P [πk ∈ Πeq]→ 1.
(iii) There exists finite integers {T˜k}k≥0 such that if Tk ≥
T˜k, for all k, then
P
[
πk → π
∗, for some π∗ ∈ Πeq
]
= 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Let us discuss the main idea behind this result. Since all
DMs use constant policies throughout any particular explo-
ration phase, each DM indeed faces a stationary Markov
decision problem in each exploration phase. Therefore, if
the length of each exploration phase is long enough and
the experimentation probabilities ρ1, . . . , ρN are small enough
(but non-zero), each DMi can learn its corresponding optimal
Q-factors in each exploration phase with arbitrary accuracy
with arbitrarily high probability. This allows each DMi to
accurately compute its near best replies to the other DMs’
policies π−ik at the end of the k−th exploration phase. Intu-
itively, allowing each DMi to update its policy πik to its near
best replies (to π−ik ) at the end of the k−th exploration phase
with some inertia λi ∈ (0, 1) results in a policy adjustment
process that approximates the best reply process with inertia
in §II-C.
7Remark 1: One may also wish to find explicit lower-
bounds on Tk to achieve almost sure convergence based on
the convergence rates of the standard Q-learning with a single
DM; we refer the reader to [42] for bounds on the convergence
rates for standard Q-learning.
IV. GENERALIZATIONS
A. Learning in Weakly Acyclic Games under Strict Better
Replies
We present another Q-learning algorithm with provable
convergence to equilibrium in discounted stochastic games
that are weakly acyclic under strict better replies. For this,
we first introduce the notion of weak acyclicity under strict
better replies. Given any π = (πi, π−i) ∈ ∆, let Υiπ denote
DMi’s set of (deterministic) better replies with respect to π,
i.e.,
Υiπ :=
{
πˆi ∈ Πi : Jx(πˆ
i, π−i) ≤ Jx(π
i, π−i), for all x
}
.
Any better reply πˆi ∈ Υiπ of DMi is called a strict better reply
(with respect to π) if
J ix(πˆ
i, π−i) < J ix(π
i, π−i), for some x.
Definition 4: We call a (possibly finite) sequence of deter-
ministic joint policies π0, π1, . . . a strict better reply path if,
for each k, πk and πk+1 differ in exactly one DM position,
say DMi, and πik+1 is a strict better reply with respect to πk.
Definition 5: A discounted stochastic game is called weakly
acyclic under strict better replies if there is a strict better reply
path starting from each deterministic joint policy and ending
at a deterministic equilibrium policy.
Since every strict best reply path is also a strict better reply
path, the set of games weakly acyclic under better replies
contain (in fact, strictly) the set of games weakly acyclic under
best replies.
It is straightforward to introduce a policy adjustment process
analogous to the one in §II-C where, at each step, each DMi
switches to one of its strict better replies with some inertia;
see Sections 6.4-6.5 in [30]. Such a process would clearly con-
verge to an equilibrium in games that are weakly acyclic under
strict better replies. We next introduce a learning algorithm
which allows each DM to learn the Q-factors corresponding
to two policies, a baseline policy and a randomly selected
experimental policy, during each exploration phase. If the
learnt Q-factors indicate that the experimental policy is better
than the baseline policy within a certain tolerance level, then
the baseline policy is updated to the experimental policy with
some inertia at the end of each exploration phase. This learning
algorithm enables DMs to adjust their policies with much less
information (as in §III-A), and follow (approximately) along
the strict better reply paths that the adjustment process follows.
Algorithm 2 (for DMi):
Set parameters as in Algorithm 1
Initialize πi0, πˆi0 ∈ Πi (arbitrary except πˆi0 6= πi0), Qi0, Qˆi0 ∈ Qi
(arbitrary)
Receive x0
Iterate k ≥ 0
(k−th exploration phase)
Iterate t = tk, . . . , tk+1 − 1
uit =
{
πik(xt), w.p. 1− ρi
any ui ∈ Ui, w.p. ρi/|Ui|
Receive ci(xt, uit, u−it )
Receive xt+1 (selected according to P [ · | xt, uit, u−it ])
nit = the number of visits to (xt, uit) in the k−th
exploration phase up to t
Qit+1(xt, u
i
t) = (1− α
i
nit
)Qit(xt, u
i
t)
+αi
nit
[
ci(xt, u
i
t, u
−i
t ) + β
iQit(xt+1, π
i
k(xt+1))
]
Qˆit+1(xt, u
i
t) = (1− α
i
nit
)Qˆit(xt, u
i
t)
+αi
nit
[
ci(xt, u
i
t, u
−i
t ) + β
iQit(xt+1, πˆ
i
k(xt+1))
]
Qit+1(x, u
i) = Qit(x, u
i), for all (x, ui) 6= (xt, uit)
Qˆit+1(x, u
i) = Qˆit(x, u
i), for all (x, ui) 6= (xt, uit)
End
If (Qˆitk+1(x, πˆ
i
k(x)) ≤ Q
i
tk+1(x, π
i
k(x)) + δ
i, for all x)
and
(Qˆitk+1(x, πˆ
i
k(x)) ≤ Q
i
tk+1
(x, πik(x))− δ
i, for some x)
πik+1 =
{
πik, w.p. λi
πˆik, w.p. 1− λi
Else
πik+1 = π
i
k
End
πˆik+1 = any policy πi ∈ Πi\{πik+1} with equal
probability
Reset Qitk+1 , Qˆ
i
tk+1
to any Qi, Qˆi ∈ Qi
End
Since any policy except the baseline policy can be chosen
as an experimental policy (with equal probability), each DM
can switch to any of its strict better replies with positive
probability. In contrast, each DM using Algorithm 1 can only
switch to one of its strict best replies. As a result, each DM
using Algorithm 2 can escape a strict best reply cycle by
switching to a strict better reply (if one exists); whereas, any
DM using Algorithm 1 cannot. This flexibility comes at the
cost of running two Q-learning recursions, one for the baseline
policy and the other for the experimental policy, instead of one.
However, this flexibility also leads to convergent behavior in
a strictly larger set of games. We cite [43] as a reference to
an earlier use of the idea of comparing two strategies and
selecting one according to the Boltzman distribution.
The counterpart of Theorem 1 can be obtained for Algo-
rithm 2 in games that are weakly acyclic under strict better
replies.
Assumption 3: For all i, 0 < δi < δˇ and 0 < ρi < ρˇ, where
δˇ and ρˇ (which depend only on the parameters of the game at
hand) are defined in Appendix C.
Theorem 2: Consider a discounted stochastic game that
is weakly acyclic under strict better replies. Suppose that
each DMi updates its policies by Algorithm 2. Let Assump-
tion 1 and 3 hold.
(i) For any ǫ > 0, there exist T˜ < ∞, k˜ < ∞ such that if
minℓ Tℓ ≥ T˜ , then
P [πk ∈ Πeq] ≥ 1− ǫ, k ≥ k˜.
(ii) If Tk →∞, then
P [πk ∈ Πeq]→ 1.
8(iii) There exists finite integers {T˜k}k≥0 such that if Tk ≥
T˜k, for all k, then
P
[
πk → π
∗, for some π∗ ∈ Πeq
]
= 1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
B. Learning in Weakly Acyclic Games under multi-DM Strict
Best or Better Replies
The notion of weak acyclicity can be generalized by allow-
ing multiple DMs to simultaneously update their policies in a
strict best or better reply path.
Definition 6: We call a (possibly finite) sequence of de-
terministic joint policies π0, π1, . . . a multi-DM strict best
(better) reply path if, for each k, πk and πk+1 differ for at
least one DM and, for each deviating DMi, πik+1 is a strict
best (better) reply with respect to πk .
Definition 7: A discounted stochastic game is called weakly
acyclic under multi-DM strict best (better) replies if there
is a multi-DM strict best (better) reply path starting from
each deterministic joint policy and ending at a deterministic
equilibrium policy.
This generalization leads to a strictly larger set of games that
are weakly acyclic. To see this, consider a single-stage game
characterized by the cost matrices in Figure 4 where DM1
chooses a row, DM2 chooses a column, and DM3 chooses a
matrix, simultaneously. Assume a > 0. There is no strict best
1 2 3
1 −a, 0, 0 0, a, 0 0,−a,−a
2 a, 0, 0 −a,−a, 0 a, 0, 0
3 0,−a,−a 0, a, 0 −a, 0,−a
1
1 2 3
1 0,−a,−a 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
2 a, 0, 0 −a, 0,−a −a,−a,−a
3 −a,−a, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
2
Fig. 4. Cost matrices of a single-stage game with three DMs.
(or better) reply path to an equilibrium from the joint decisions
(1, 1, 1), (1, 3, 1), (3, 3, 1), (3, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (3, 1, 2), if only
a single DM can update its decision at a time. Therefore, this
game is not weakly acyclic under strict best (or better) replies
in the sense of Definition 3 (or Definition 5). However, if
multiple DMs are allowed to switch to their strict best (or
better) replies simultaneously, then it becomes possible to
reach the equilibrium (2, 3, 2) from any joint decision. For
example, if DM2 and DM3 switch to their strict best (or
better) replies simultaneously from the joint decision (1, 1, 1),
then the resulting joint decision would be (1, 3, 2). This would
subsequently lead to the equilibrium (2, 3, 2) if DM1 switches
to its strict best (or better) reply from (1, 3, 2).
All learning algorithms introduced in the paper allow multi-
ple DMs to simultaneously update their policies with positive
probability. In view of this, it is straightforward to see that
our main convergence results Theorem 1 (Theorem 2) hold
in games that are weakly acyclic under multi-DM strict best
(better) replies.
V. A SIMULATION STUDY: PRISONER’S DILEMMA WITH A
STATE
We consider a discounted stochastic game with two DMs
where X = U1 = U2 = {1, 2}. Each DMi’s utility (to be
maximized) at each time t ≥ 0 depends only on the joint
decisions (u1t , u2t ) of both DMs as
DMi:
DM−i:
1 2
1 c a
2 b 0
Fig. 5. DMi’s single-stage utility.
We assume b > c > 0 > a. The state evolves as
P
[
xt+1 = 1 | (u
1
t , u
2
t ) = (1, 1)
]
= 1− γ
P
[
xt+1 = 2 | (u
1
t , u
2
t ) 6= (1, 1)
]
= 1− γ
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and P [x0 = 1] = 1/2.
The single-stage game corresponds to the well-known pris-
oner’s dilemma where the i−th prisoner (DMi) cooperates
(defects) at time t by choosing uit = 1 (uit = 2). The single-
stage game has a unique equilibrium (u1, u2) = (2, 2), i.e.,
both DMs defect, leading to rewards (0, 0). The dilemma
is that each DM can do strictly better by cooperating, i.e.,
(u1, u2) = (1, 1) (not an equilibrium).
In the multi-stage game, the state xt indicates, w.p. 1 − γ,
whether or not both DMs cooperated in the previous stage. It
turns out that cooperation can be obtained as an equilibrium of
the multi-stage game if the DMs are patient, i.e., the discount
factors are sufficiently high, and the error probability γ is
sufficiently small . Note that each DMi has four different
policies of the form πi : X → Ui. For large enough
β1, β2, and small enough γ, the multi-stage game has two
(Markov perfect) equilibria. In one equilibrium, called the
cooperation equilibrium, each DM cooperates if x = 1 and
defects otherwise. In the other equilibrium, called the defection
equilibrium, both DMs always defect. Furthermore, from any
joint policy in Π1 × Π2, there is a strict best reply path to
one of these two equilibria, which implies that the multi-stage
game is weakly acyclic under strict best replies.
We set b = 2, c = 1, a = −1, γ = 0.3. We simulate
Algorithm 1 with the following parameter values: ρi = 0.1,
λi = 0.5, δi = 0, αik = 1/k
0.51
, for all i, k. We keep the
lengths of the exploration phases constants, i.e, Tk = T , for
all k. We consider different values for T since the lengths
of the exploration phases appear to be most critical for the
behavior of the learning process. For each value of T , we run
Algorithm 1 and the best reply process with inertia (in §II-C) in
parallel, with 1000 policy updates starting from each of the 16
initial joint policies in Π. We initialize all the learnt Q-factors
at 0 for each simulation run; however, we do not reset the
learnt Q-factors at the end of any exploration phase during any
simulation run. We let πk and π˘k denote the policies generated
by Algorithm 1 and the best reply process with inertia in §II-C,
respectively. For each value of T , Table V shows the fraction
of times at which πk visits an equilibrium and the fraction
of times at which πk agrees with π˘k , during the 1000 policy
updates (averaged uniformly over all 16 initial policies in Π).
9The results in Table V reveals that, as T increases, πk
visits an equilibrium and agrees with π˘k more often. This is
consistent with Theorem 1 since DMs are expected to learn
their Q-factors more accurately with higher probability for
larger values of T . When T is sufficiently large, the polices
πk are at equilibrium and agrees with π˘k nearly all of the
time regardless of the initial policy. In a typical simulation run
(with a large enough T ), the polices πk and π˘k transition to
an equilibrium in few steps and stay at equilibrium thereafter.
T
1
1001
∑1000
k=0 I{pik∈Πe}(averaged over pi0 ∈ Π)
1
1001
∑1000
k=0 I{pik=p˘ik}(averaged over pi0 ∈ Π)
10 0.2581 0.1254
25 0.5274 0.3410
50 0.7835 0.6170
100 0.9282 0.6301
1000 0.9935 0.6879
10000 0.9978 0.7733
50000 0.9976 0.9705
TABLE I
THE FRACTION OF TIMES AT WHICH pik VISITS AN EQUILIBRIUM AND
THE FRACTION OF TIMES AT WHICH pik AGREES WITH p˘ik .
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we develop decentralized Q-learning algo-
rithms and present their convergence properties for stochastic
games under weak acyclicity. This is the first paper, to our
knowledge, that presents learning algorithms with convergence
to equilibria in large classes of stochastic games. The decision
makers observe only their own decisions and cost realizations,
and the state transitions; they need not even know the presence
of the other decision makers.
Our approach has a two-time scale flavor; however, unlike
the existing work on multi-time-scale learning, it does not
depend on the stochastic approximation theory. Note that the
existing work on multi-time-scale learning, e.g., [11], [14],
[32], [38], require the stability analysis of some ordinary
differential equations (ODE) describing the mean behavior of
the learning algorithms. Aside from the difficulty of choosing
the step sizes running at multiple time scales, the existing work
involves nonlinear ODEs whose analysis does not seem to be
within reach even for dynamic team problems. In contrast,
our approach leads to a considerably simpler analysis for all
weakly acyclic stochastic games.
APPENDIX A
A UNIFORM CONVERGENCE RESULT FOR THE STANDARD
Q-LEARNING ALGORITHM WITH A SINGLE DM
Convergence of the standard Q-learning algorithm with a
single DM is well known [31]. However, to prove the results
of this paper, we need the sample paths generated by the
standard Q-learning algorithm to well behave with respect
to the initial conditions. Let us now consider a single-DM
version of the setup introduced in §II where the DM index
i (in the superscript) is dropped (only in Appendix A) and
c(x, u) representing the one-stage cost for applying control u
at x is an exogenous random variable with finite variance. Let
us assume that a single DM using a stationary random policy
π ∈ ∆ updates its Q-factors as: for t ≥ 0,
Qt+1(x, u) = Qt(x, u), for all (x, u) 6= (xt, ut) (6)
Qt+1(xt, ut) = Qt(xt, ut) + αnt
(
c(xt, ut)
+ βmin
v
Qt(xt+1, v)−Qt(xt, ut)
)
(7)
where the initial condition Q0 is given, ut is chosen according
to π(xt), the state xt evolves according to P [ · |xt, ut] starting
at x0, nt is the number of visits to (xt, ut) up to time t, and
{αn}n≥0 is a sequence of step sizes satisfying
αn ∈ [0, 1],
∑
n
αn =∞,
∑
n
α2n <∞.
Lemma 1: Assume that each (x, u) is visited infinitely often
w.p. 1. For any ǫ > 0 and compact Q ∈ R|X×U|, there exists
TQǫ <∞ such that, for any Q0 ∈ Q,
P
[
sup
t≥TQǫ
∣∣Qt − Q¯∣∣∞ ≤ ǫ
]
≥ 1− ǫ
where | · |∞ denotes the maximum norm and Q¯ is the unique
fixed point of the mapping F : X× U 7→ X× U defined by
F (Q)(x, u) = E[c(x, u)] + β
∑
x′
P [x′|x, u] min
v
Q(x′, v)
for all x, u.
Proof: Let {Q′t}t≥0 and {Q′′t }t≥0 be the trajectories for
the initial conditions Q′0 and Q′′0 , respectively, corresponding
to a sample path {(xt, ut, c(xt, ut))}t≥0. It is easy to see that,
for all t ≥ 0,
|Q′t+1(xt, ut)−Q
′′
t+1(xt, ut)|
≤ (1− αnt)|Q
′
t(xt, ut)−Q
′′
t (xt, ut)|+ αntβ|Q
′
t −Q
′′
t |∞.
This implies that Mt := supQ′
0
,Q′′
0
∈Q |Q
′
t − Q
′′
t |∞ is non-
increasing and therefore convergent. Suppose that Mt →
M¯ > 0. There exists some t¯ < ∞ such that maxt≥t¯Mt <
M¯(1 + 1/β)/2. Hence, we have, for all t ≥ t¯,
|Q′t+1(xt, ut)−Q
′′
t+1(xt, ut)|
≤ (1 − αnt)|Q
′
t(xt, ut)−Q
′′
t (xt, ut)|+ αntβ
M¯(1 + 1/β)
2
.
This leads to: for all (x, u) and t ≥ t¯,
|Q′t+1(x, u)−Q
′′
t+1(x, u)|
≤ Π
mt(x,u)
s=0 (1− αs)M0
+
[
1− Π
mt(x,u)
s=0 (1− αs)
]
βM¯(1 + 1/β)/2
where mt(x, u) :=
∑t
s=0 I{(xt,ut)=(x,u)} is the number of
visits to (x, u) in [0, t]. Since each (x, u) is visited infinitely
often w.p. 1 and
∑
s αs = ∞, we have, for each (x, u),
Π
mt(x,u)
s=0 (1 − αs) → 0 as t → ∞ w.p. 1. This implies that
M¯ ≤ βM¯(1 + 1/β)/2 < M¯ w.p. 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, Mt → 0, w.p. 1.
Theorem 4 in [31] shows that, for any initial condition Q0,
Qt → Q¯, w.p. 1. Hence, for any Q′0 ∈ Q, we have |Q′t−Q¯|∞+
supQ′′
0
∈Q |Q
′
t−Q
′′
t |∞ → 0, w.p. 1. Therefore, supQ′′
0
∈Q |Q
′′
t −
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Q¯|∞ → 0, w.p. 1. This leads to the desired result, i.e., for any
ǫ > 0 and compact Q ∈ R|X×U|, there exists TQǫ < ∞ such
that
P
[
sup
t≥TQǫ
sup
Q′′
0
∈Q
|Q′′t − Q¯|∞ ≤ ǫ
]
≥ 1− ǫ.
Remark 2: The Q-factors corresponding to a certain deter-
ministic policy πˆ can be learnt by modifying the recursion
(6)-(7) as follows: for t ≥ 0,
Qˆt+1(x, u) = Qˆt(x, u), for all (x, u) 6= (xt, ut)
Qˆt+1(xt, ut) = Qˆt(xt, ut) + αnt (c(xt, ut)
+βQˆt(xt+1, πˆ(xt+1))− Qˆt(xt, ut)
)
where the initial condition Qˆ0 is given and ut is chosen
according to π(xt). Hence, the uniform convergence result in
Lemma 1 also holds for the this recursion.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For any π−i ∈ ∆−i, let F iπ−i denote the self-mapping of
X× Ui defined by
F iπ−i(Q
i)(x, ui) =Eπ−i(x)
[
ci
(
x, ui, u−i
)
+ βi
∑
x′
P
[
x′|x, ui, u−i
]
min
vi
Qi(x′, vi)
]
for all x, ui. It is well-known that F iπ−i is a contraction
mapping with the Lipschitz constant βi with respect to the
maximum norm. Recall from (2) that each DMi’s optimal Q-
factors Qiπ−i is the unique fixed point of F iπ−i . We also note
that, during the k−th exploration phase, each DMi actually
uses the random policy π¯ik defined as
π¯jk = (1 − ρ
j)πjk + ρ
jνj (8)
where νj is the random policy that assigns the uniform
distribution on Uj to each x.
Lemma 2: For any ǫ > 0, there exists Tǫ <∞ such that, if
Tk ≥ Tǫ, then
P
[∣∣Qitk+1 −Qiπ¯−i
k
∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ, for all i
]
≥ 1− ǫ.
Proof: Note that the k−th exploration phase starts with
xkT , which belongs to the finite state space X, and Qitk ∈ Q
i
,
where Qi is compact, for all i. Note also that, during each
exploration phase, DMs use stationary random policies of the
form (8) and there are finitely many such joint policies. Hence,
the desired result follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
Lemma 3: For any ǫ > 0, there exists ρǫ > 0 such that, if
ρi ≤ ρǫ, for all i, then∣∣∣Qiπ−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
∣∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ, for all i, k.
Proof: We have∣∣∣Qi
π−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
∣∣∣
∞
=
∣∣∣F i
π−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)− F i
π¯−i
k
(Qi
π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤
∣∣∣F iπ−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)− F i
π¯−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣F i
π¯−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)− F i
π¯−i
k
(Qi
π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤

1−∏
j 6=i
(1− ρj)

×
∣∣∣F iπ−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)− F i
φ−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
+ βi
∣∣∣Qi
π−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
∣∣∣
∞
where φ−ik ∈ ∆−i is some convex combination of the policies
in ∆−i of the form where each DMj , j 6= i, either uses its
baseline policy πjk ∈ Πj or the uniform distribution3. Because
(π−ik , φ
−i
k ) belongs to a finite subset of Π−i ×∆−i, an upper
bound F¯ <∞ on∣∣∣F i
π−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)− F i
φ−i
k
(Qi
π−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
exists, which is uniform in (π−ik , φ
−i
k ). This results in∣∣∣Qiπ−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
∣∣∣
∞
≤

1−∏
j 6=i
(1− ρj)

 F¯
1− βi
which proves the lemma.
Let δ¯ denote the minimum separation between the entries
of DMs’ optimal Q-factors (with respect to the deterministic
policies), defined as4
δ¯ := min
i,x,vi,v˜i,π−i∈Π−i:
Qi
π−i
(x,vi) 6=Qi
π−i
(x,v˜i)
∣∣Qiπ−i(x, vi)−Qiπ−i(x, v˜i)∣∣ .
We consider δ¯ to be an upper bound on the tolerance levels
for sub-optimality, i.e., δi ∈ (0, δ¯), for all i. In that case, we
also introduce an upper bound ρ¯ > 0 on the experimentation
rates such that, if ρi ≤ ρ¯, for all i, then∣∣∣Qiπ−i
k
−Qi
π¯−i
k
∣∣∣
∞
<
1
2
min{δi, δ¯ − δi}, for all i, k. (9)
Such an upper bound ρ¯ > 0 exists due to Lemma 3.
Lemma 4: Suppose δi ∈ (0, δ¯), ρi ∈ (0, ρ¯), for all i. For
any ǫ > 0, there exist T¯ <∞, such that, if Tk ≥ T¯ , then
P [Ek] ≥ 1− ǫ
where Ek, k ≥ 0, is the random event defined as
Ek :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∣∣∣Qitk+1 −Qiπk
∣∣∣
∞
<
1
2
min{δi, δ¯ − δi},
for all i
}
.
Proof: The desired result follows from Lemma 2 and (9).
3More precisely, φ−i
k
=
∑
J⊂{1,...,N}\{i} aJφ
−i
k,J
where aJ :=
∏
j∈J (1−ρ
j)
∏
j 6∈J∪{i} ρ
j
1−
∏
j 6=i(1−ρ
j)
and φk,J ∈ ∆−i is a policy such that φjk,J = pi
j
k
for j ∈ J and φj
k,J
= νj for j 6∈ J ∪ {i}.
4To avoid trivial cases, we assume Qi
pi−i
(x, vi) 6= Qi
pi−i
(x, v˜i) for some
i, x, vi, v˜i, pi−i ∈ Π−i.
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A. Proof of part (i)
Note that
ω ∈ Ek ⇒ Ππk = Πk+1 = Π
1
k+1 × · · · ×Π
N
k+1.
Therefore, we have
P [πk+1 = πk|Ek, πk ∈ Πeq] = 1, for all k. (10)
Since we have a weakly acyclic game at hand, for each π ∈ Π,
there exists a strict best reply path of minimum length Lπ <∞
starting at π and ending at an equilibrium policy. Let L :=
maxπ∈Π Lπ. There exists pmin ∈ (0, 1) (which depends only
on λ1, . . . , λN , and L) such that, for all k,
P
[
πk+L ∈ Πeq
∣∣Ek, . . . , Ek+L−1, πk 6∈ Πeq] ≥ pmin. (11)
Pick ǫ˜ ∈ (0, ǫ) satisfying(
(1− ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜+ (1− ǫ˜)pmin
− ǫ˜
)
(1− ǫ˜) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Lemma 4 implies the existence of T˜ < ∞ such that, if
minℓ Tℓ ≥ T˜ , then
P [Ek, . . . , Ek+L−1] ≥ 1− ǫ˜, for all k. (12)
For the rest of this part, we assume minℓ Tℓ ≥ T˜ . From (10),
(11), (12), we obtain
P [πk+L ∈ Πeq|πk 6∈ Πeq] ≥ pmin(1− ǫ˜), for all k
and
P [πk+L = · · · = πk|πk ∈ Πeq] ≥ 1− ǫ˜, for all k. (13)
This leads to the recursive inequalities
p(n+1)L ≥ (1− ǫ˜)[pnL + pmin(1− pnL)] (14)
where pk := P [πk ∈ Πeq], for all k. Note that we have, for
all n,
p(n+1)L − pnL ≥ −ǫ˜. (15)
We rewrite (14) as
p(n+1)L−pnL ≥ [ǫ˜+ (1 − ǫ˜)pmin]
[
(1− ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜+ (1 − ǫ˜)pmin
− pnL
]
.
This shows that if
pnL ≤
(1− ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜+ (1− ǫ˜)pmin
− ǫ˜ (16)
we have p(n+1)L ≥ pnL + pminǫ˜. Therefore, whenever pnL
satisfies (16), it will increase by at least pminǫ˜ until it exceeds
the right hand side of (16), which will happen in a finite
number of steps. In fact, pnL would increase as long as
pnL <
(1−ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜+(1−ǫ˜)pmin
. On the other hand, if pnL ≥ (1−ǫ˜)pminǫ˜+(1−ǫ˜)pmin ,
pnL cannot decrease more than ǫ˜; recall (15). Therefore, there
exists n˜ <∞ such that, for all n ≥ n˜,
pnL ≥
(1− ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜ + (1− ǫ˜)pmin
− ǫ˜.
Finally, due to (13), we have, for all n ≥ n˜, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L−1},
pnL+ℓ ≥
(
(1− ǫ˜)pmin
ǫ˜+ (1− ǫ˜)pmin
− ǫ˜
)
(1− ǫ˜) ≥ 1− ǫ.
B. Proof of part (ii)
For any ǫ > 0, let T˜ < ∞, k˜ < ∞ be as in part (i). Let
kˆ < ∞ be such that mink≥kˆ Tk ≥ T˜ . It is straightforward to
see from the proof of part (i) that, for all k ≥ kˆ+ k˜, we have
P [πk ∈ Πeq] ≥ 1− ǫ.
C. Proof of part (iii)
Pick a sequence {ǫ˜n}n≥0 satisfying ǫ˜n > 0, for all n, and∑
n
(1− pmin)
−nǫ˜n <∞ (17)
where pmin is as in (11). Lemma 4 implies the existence of a
sequence {T˜n}n≥0 of finite integers such that if
TnL, . . . , T(n+1)L−1 ≥ T˜n (18)
then
P
[
EnL, . . . , E(n+1)L−1
]
≥ 1− ǫ˜n. (19)
We assume (18) (therefore (19)) holds for all n. This leads to
P [π(n+1)L 6∈ Πeq] ≤ (1− pmin)P [πnL 6∈ Πeq] + ǫ˜n.
From this, it is straightforward to obtain
P
[
π(n+1)L /∈ Πe
]
≤ (1 − pmin)
n
(
1 +
n∑
s=0
(1 − pmin)
−sǫ˜s
)
.
Due to (19), we have, for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1},
P [πnL+ℓ ∈ Πeq] ≥ (1− ǫ˜n)P [πnL ∈ Πeq] .
Therefore, for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1},
P
[
π(n+1)L+ℓ /∈ Πeq
]
≤ (1− pmin)
n
(
1 +
n∑
s=0
(1− pmin)
−sǫ˜s
)
+ ǫ˜n+1.
From this and (17), we obtain∑
k≥1
P [πk /∈ Πe]
≤ L
∑
n≥0
[
(1− pmin)
n
(
1 +
n∑
s=0
(1 − pmin)
−sǫ˜s
)
+ ǫ˜n+1
]
<∞.
Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies
P [πk /∈ Πeq, for infinitely many k] = 0. (20)
From (17) and (19), we obtain ∑k≥0 P [Ω\Ek] <∞. Borel-
Cantelli Lemma again implies
P [Ω\Ek, for infinitely many k] = 0. (21)
Finally, (20) and (21) imply the desired result.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For any π = (πi, π−i) ∈ Πi × ∆−i, let F iπ denote the
self-mapping of X× Ui defined by
F iπ(Q
i)(x, ui) =Eπ−i(x)
[
ci
(
x, ui, u−i
)
+ βi
∑
x′
P
[
x′|x, ui, u−i
]
Qi(x′, πi(x′))
]
for all x, ui. It is well-known that F iπ is a contraction mapping
with the Lipschitz constant βi with respect to the maximum
norm. Let us denote the unique fixed point of F iπ by Qiπ. We
also note that, during the k−th exploration phase, each DMi
actually uses the random policy π¯ik defined as
π¯jk = (1 − ρ
j)πjk + ρ
jνj (22)
where νj is the random policy that assigns the uniform
distribution on Uj to each x.
Lemma 5: For any ǫ > 0, there exists Tǫ <∞ such that, if
T ≥ Tǫ, then
P
[ ∣∣∣Qitk+1 −Qi(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ and∣∣∣Qˆitk+1 −Qi(πˆi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ, for all i
]
≥ 1− ǫ, for all k.
Proof: Note that each exploration phase starts with xkT ,
which belongs to a finite state space, and QikT , QˆikT ∈ Qi,
where Qi is compact, for all i. Note also that, during each
exploration phase, DMs use stationary random policies of
the form (22) and there are finitely many such joint poli-
cies. Hence, the desired result follows from Lemma 1 in
Appendix A; see Remark 2.
Lemma 6: For any ǫ > 0, there exists ρǫ > 0 such that, if
ρi ≤ ρǫ, for all i, then∣∣∣Qi(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ
and
∣∣∣Qi(πˆi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πˆi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤ ǫ, for all i, k.
Proof: We have∣∣∣Qi(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
=
∣∣∣F i
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)
− F i
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
)∣∣∣
∞
≤
∣∣∣F i(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)
− F i
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣F i
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)
− F i
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
)∣∣∣
∞
≤

1−∏
j 6=i
(1 − ρj)

×
∣∣∣F i(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)
− F i
(πi
k
,φ−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)∣∣∣
∞
+ βi
∣∣∣Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
where φ−ik ∈ ∆−i is some convex combination of the joint
policies of the form where each DMj , j 6= i, either uses its
baseline policy πjk ∈ Πj or the uniform distribution (as in
Appendix B). Because (πik, π−ik , φ−ik ) belongs to a finite subset
of Πi ×Π−i ×∆−i, an upper bound Fˇ <∞ on∣∣∣F i(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)
− F i
(πi
k
,φ−i
k
)
(
Qi
(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
)∣∣∣
∞
exists, which is uniform in (πik, π
−i
k , φ
−i
k ). This results in∣∣∣Qi(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
≤

1−∏
j 6=i
(1 − ρj)

 Fˇ
1− βi
which leads to the first bound. The second bound can be
obtained similarly.
Let δˇ denote the minimum separation between the entries
of DMs’ Q-factors (for deterministic policies), defined as5
δˇ := min
{∣∣Qi(πi,π−i)(x, πi(x)) −Qi(π˜i,π−i)(x, π˜i(x))∣∣ :
i, x, πi, π˜i ∈ Πi, π−i ∈ Π−i,
Qi(πi,π−i)(x, π
i(x)) 6= Qi(π˜i,π−i)(x, π˜
i(x))
}
.
We consider δˇ to be an upper bound on the tolerance levels
for sub-optimality, i.e., δi ∈ (0, δˇ), for all i. In that case, we
also introduce an upper bound ρˇ > 0 on the experimentation
rates such that, if ρi ≤ ρˇ, for all i, then
max
{ ∣∣∣Qi(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
,∣∣∣Qi
(πˆi
k
,π−i
k
)
−Qi
(πˆi
k
,π¯−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
}
<
1
2
min{δi, δˇ − δi}
(23)
for all i, k. Such an upper bound ρˇ > 0 exists due to Lemma 6.
Lemma 7: Suppose 0 < δi < δˇ, 0 < ρi < ρˇ, for all i. For
any ǫ > 0, there exist T¯ <∞, such that, if Tk ≥ T¯ , then
P
[
Eˇk
]
≥ 1− ǫ
where Eˇk, k ≥ 0, is the random event defined as
Eˇk :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : max
{ ∣∣∣Qitk+1 −Qi(πi
k
,π−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
,∣∣∣Qˆitk+1 −Qi(πˆi
k
,π−i
k
)
∣∣∣
∞
}
<
1
2
min{δi, δˇ − δi}, for all i
}
.
Proof: The desired result follows from Lemma 5 and (23).
We have
P
[
πk+1 = πk|Eˇk, πk ∈ Πeq
]
= 1, for all k. (24)
Since we have a weakly acyclic game at hand, for each π ∈
Π, there exists a strict better reply path of minimum length
Lˇπ <∞ starting at π and ending at an equilibrium policy. Let
Lˇ := maxπ∈Π Lˇπ. There exists pˇmin ∈ (0, 1) (which depends
only on λ1, . . . , λN , and L) such that, for all k,
P
[
πk+Lˇ ∈ Πeq
∣∣Eˇk, . . . , Eˇk+L−1, πk 6∈ Πeq] ≥ pˇmin. (25)
Pick ǫˇ ∈ (0, ǫ) satisfying(
(1− ǫˇ)pˇmin
ǫˇ + (1− ǫˇ)pˇmin
− ǫˇ
)
(1− ǫˇ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
5We assume Qi
(pii,pi−i)
(x, pii(x)) 6= Qi
(p˜ii,pi−i)
(x, p˜ii(x)), for some i,
x, pii, p˜ii ∈ Πi, pi−i ∈ Π−i, to avoid trivial cases.
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Lemma 7 implies the existence of Tˇ < ∞ such that, if
minℓ Tℓ ≥ Tˇ , then
P
[
Eˇk, . . . , Eˇk+L−1
]
≥ 1− ǫˇ, for all k. (26)
For the rest of the proof, we assume minℓ Tℓ ≥ Tˇ . From (24),
(25), (26), we obtain, for all k,
P
[
πk+Lˇ ∈ Πeq|πk 6∈ Πeq
]
≥ pˇmin(1− ǫˇ)
and P
[
πk+Lˇ = · · · = πk|πk ∈ Πeq
]
≥ 1− ǫˇ.
This leads to the recursive inequalities
p(n+1)Lˇ ≥ (1− ǫˇ)[pnLˇ + pˇmin(1− pnLˇ)], n ≥ 0 (27)
where pk := P [πk ∈ Πeq]. Note that these inequalities are
similar to (14) and by similar reasoning, there exists nˇ < ∞
such that, for all n ≥ nˇ and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1},
pnLˇ+ℓ ≥
(
(1− ǫˇ)pˇmin
ǫˇ+ (1− ǫˇ)pˇmin
− ǫˇ
)
(1− ǫˇ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
This proves part (i). The proofs of part (ii)-(iii) are analogous
to the proofs of part (ii)-(iii) of Theorem 1, respectively.
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